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The commercialization of sport has transformed the landscape of college athletics. As a non-
2 
profit organization, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) regulated competition 
between colleges and universities on principles like amateurism. But college athletics has 
boomed into a billion-dollar business while the NCAA clings to outdated policies, which restrict 
student-athletes from marketing their name, image, and likeness. 0 'Bannon v. NCAA, however, 
threatens to break the hold that the NCAA has over the rights of student-athletes. A victory in 
O'Bannon puts student-athletes closer to receiving the compensation they deserve. The NCAA' s 
policies are overly restrictive, and more about profit of the NCAA than the wellbeing of its 
student-athletes. This paper considers the NCAA' s arguments against allowing compensation for 
name, image, and likeness, and analyzes the shortcomings of these assertions. 
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0 'Bannon v NCAA threatens to alter the landscape of college athletics by allowing 
student-athletes to receive compensation for the use of their name, image, and likeness. The 
NCAA vehemently opposes allowing student-athletes to cash in on any ofthe billion-dollar 
business that is college athletics. The NCAA uses its amateurism policy as a crutch to deny -
student-athletes the compensation they deserve. This article will provide a background of the 
O'Bannon litigation and consider the NCAA's defense of its policies, highlighting the 
inconsistencies in the organization's arguments. 
The NCAA and Amateurism 
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Intercollegiate sports began nearly 150 years ago, when Rutgers and Princeton competed 
in the first college football game in America. The game' s popularity exploded across the country 
over the following decades. That version of football was a violent game; some players even died. 
Some colleges hired non-students as ringers to improve the teams. Intercollegiate football was 
unregulated and full of problems. ( 0 'Bannon v. NCAA , 20 15) 
In 1905, the presidents of sixty-two colleges convened to establish a governing body to 
create uniform rules and regulations for intercollegiate football (0 'Bannon v. NCAA, 2015). That 
organization, the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"), has since grown to 
include more than 1,100 member institutions (NCAA 101 , 20 16). The NCAA describes itself as 
dedicated to protecting the wellbeing of student-athletes and setting these student-a~hletes up 
with the skills necessary to succeed on the athletically, academically, and throughout life (NCAA 
1 OJ , 2016). Schools are divided into three divisions, with Division I institutions having the 
largest athletic departments. The 350 members that make up Division I provide the most 
financial aid to student -athletes (NCAA 101, 20 16), and the industry surrounding these athletics 
generates billions of dollars annually (Keilman & Hopkins, 2015). In football only, Division I is 
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subdivided into two groups. The Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) consists of the top-level 
football programs that participate in the College Football Playoffs and bowl games, instead of an 
NCAA-run championship. 
One of the earliest reforms enacted by the NCAA was the amateurism rules, which 
require all student-athletes to be amateurs in order to participate in intercollegiate sports, and that 
their athletic activities be conducted as an integral part of their educational experience 
(O'Bannon v. NCAA, 2015). In order to do this, the NCAA permits member institutions to 
provide student-athletes with scholarships for cost of attendance, including tuition, fees, room 
and board, and textbooks (Solomon, 20 15). 
In addition to financial aid rules, the NCAA has adopted many rules limiting student-
athlete compensation and interaction with professionals. If a student-athlete hires an agent, signs 
a contract with a professional team, or enters a pro draft, the student-athlete forfeits amateur 
status and is ineligible to compete in collegiate athletics (Division I Manual, 2015). Further, a 
student-athlete cannot receive any compensation (outside of permitted scholarship) based on 
athletic performance from boosters, companies seeking endorsements, or anyone seeking to use 
the athlete's Name, Image, and Likeness ("NIL"). 
O'Bannon v. NCAA Litigation 
Ed O'Bannon, former All-American and National Player of the Year for the UCLA 
men's basketball team (UCLA Athletic Communications Office, 2015), discovered that he was 
depicted in a college basketball video game produced by Electronic Arts (EA). In the game, a 
virtual player physically resembled O'Bannon, playing for UCLA and wearing O'Bannon's 
jersey number, 31 (O 'Bannon v. NCAA, 2015). O 'Bannon said he never consented to the use of 
his likeness in the video game, and that he was not compensated for his aMJearance ( 0 'Bannon v. 
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NCAA, 2015). In 2009, O'Bannon filed a federal suit against the NCAA. O'Bannon was 
consolidated with another case, Keller v Electronic Arts, and became a class-action suit only for 
high-level (Division VFBS) college football and men's basketball players. 
O'Bannon Complaint 
In the complaint, O'Bannon argued that the NCAA' s amateurism rules were an illegal 
restraint of trade, under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, because the rules stopped student-athletes 
from receiving payment for the use of their NIL. Section 1 prohibits "every contract, 
combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of commerce among the several states" (Cotton & 
Wolohan, 2013, p. 626). O'Bannon argued that the NCAA is in violation of the Sherman Act by 
fixing the amount that student-athletes could receive for their NIL at zero. Further, O'Bannon 
said that student-athletes were required to relinquish, in perpetuity, all rights related to the use of 
NIL. 
NCAA Defense 
The NCAA, in its defense, argued that the compensation of student-athletes for the use of 
NIL would violate its amateurism policy, which the NCAA considers a bedrock principle of 
intercollegiate athletics. Further, the NCAA offered that there are procompetitive purposes for 
rules that prohibit compensation for NIL, including preserving amateurism in college sports, 
promoting competitive balance between teams and conferences, integrating academics and 
athletics, and increasing output in the college market. 
Procedural History 
The district court ruled in favpr of O'Bannon, stating that the NCAA had legitimate 
means for less-restrictive alternatives to the prohibition. The court ruled that student-athletes 
should receive scholarship up to the "full cost of attendance" ( 0 'Bannon v. NCAA, 20 16). 
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Further, the court found that the NCAA could not prohibit member institutions from holding a 
portion of their licensing revenues in a trust, which could then be used to pay student-athletes as 
much as $5000 after they leave college. 
The NCAA appealed the ruling, and the circuit court upheld in part and dismissed in part 
the district court' s ruling. The appellate court upheld the increase in scholarship to full cost of 
attendance, but struck down the deferred payment for the use of NIL. The district court believed 
that "the difference between offering student-athletes education-related compensation and 
offering them cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not minor; it is a quantum leap" 
(O 'Bannon v. NCAA, 2015). 
Analysis 
This "quantum leap," which the court refers to, is one that should be made. High-level 
collegiate student-athletes should be allowed to receive compensation for the use of their NIL. 
The student-athletes are the only members of the intercollegiate sports system that do not get 
paid. It grows increasingly difficult to justify the NCAA's amateurism policy as the FBS football 
and Division I basketball continue to generate billions of dollars for the NCAA, conferences, 
member institutions, administrators, coaches, and more. The student-athletes, meanwhile, see 
none of this revenue outside of their grant -in-aid. It is important to note, as in the 0 'Bannon 
case, that the scope ofthis analysis is to Division IIFBS football and men' s basketball players. 
Non-athlete students 
.>· 
To be fair, student-athletes are not the only ones waiving their image rights. Non-athlete 
students at most colleges and universities are required to release image rights. Colleges can use 
photos of a student for commercial purposes without compensating the student. This usage, 
however, is limited only to university promotions. The college does have the right to use the 
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NIL, but the college cannot sell or license that student's name, image, and likeness to another 
organization. If so, any student attending college across the country would lose his or her rights 
to his or her own likeness. The NCAA, then, should not be allowed to license the use of student-
athletes NIL to an outside organization, like EA Sports, without compensation for the student-
athlete. 
One might argue that such a restriction is justifiable because these student-athletes 
receive compensation up to the full cost of attendance. However, many non-athlete students also 
receive scholarships, whether on the basis of academic merit, financial need, or talent in a 
specific field. If a college student studying acting or dance was paid to be in a professional 
performance, the university certainly would not punish the student-actor. On the contrary, it is 
likely that the institution would support and promote the student-actor, even as the collegian 
received compensation for his or her talents. The student-actor and student-athlete are similar in 
every way, showcasing their talents in front of a large audience, except that one appears on a 
stage and the other appears on a court. Even though spectators pay to see both the actor and the 
athlete, only the actor is getting paid under current NCAA policy. There is no persuasive 
justification for the disparity. 
Mandatory Forfeiture of Rights 
While the NCAA stated that the release of NIL was not a requirement to participate in 
intercollegiate athletics, depositions in the case showed that student-athletes and coaches alike 
believed that the release was mandatory ( 0 'Bannon v. NCAA, 20 15). A release that waived 
student-athletes' right to publicity us~d to be included in the "student-athlete statement," which 
is a form used to confirm a student-athletes' eligibility. And while the NCAA has dropped the 
NIL waiver from the requirements, most Division IIFBS conferences still utilize such waiver at 
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the conference level (NCAA 101, 2016). The Mid-American Conference ("MAC"), which is 
made up entirely of Division IIFBS schools, uses a mandatory waiver that requires student-
athletes to give up rights to their NILs without compensation, in perpetuity, for any purpose that 
the conference or its member schools see fit. Failure to sign the release precludes a student-
athlete from competing in the MAC. 
Competitive Balance 
Certainly, requiring student-athletes to relinquish all image rights is overly restrictive, 
and in violation of the Sherman Act. The NCAA maintains the restrictions challenged under 
O'Bannon are required to protect the competitive balance of intercollegiate athletics (Davison, 
2015). Both the district and circuit courts rightfully held that blocking student-athletes from 
marketing their NIL had no effect on competitive balance. High-revenue schools already are able 
to attract better talent by spending millions on brand new facilities and big-name coaches. The 
NCAA's argument wrongfully assumes that there is currently competitive balance in college 
athletics. The University of Alabama's dominance in football is a clear illustration of the lack of 
balance. The Crimson Tide have won four national championships in the last seven years. 
Consumer Opinion 
The competitive balance that the NCAA defends is what the association claims drives 
consumer demand for its product (Davison, 2015). In O'Bannon, the NCAA cited surveys that 
found consumers were uncomfortable with the idea of paying student-athletes ( 0 'Bannon v. 
NCAA, 2015). This argument, however, seems to contradict what the NCAA states is its core 
principle. The NCAA proclaims that its primary focus is to protect the well-being of student-
athletes and ensure that sports are conducted as an integral part of the student-athletes' 
educational experiences. If the NCAA is focused on people, not profit, why must the 
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organization make its decisions based on what drives profit? Much of the NCAA's defense of 
these restrictions is based on its moral principles. And yet, when it comes to choosing between 
the student-athlete's wellbeing and the promise of bigger profits, the NCAA takes the money 
every time. 
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The 0 'Bannon decision notes that the public was also uncomfortable with the idea of the 
International Olympic Committee ("IOC") allowing professionals to participate (2015). People 
worried that it would ruin the integrity of the Olympics. The IOC developed a trust system that is 
very similar to what was proposed by 0 'Bannon and accepted by the district court (Sheetz, 
2016). Revenue from Olympic athlete endorsements is held in a trust, which can only be 
accessed for necessary expenses during competition and withdrawn upon completion (Sheetz, 
2016). Despite public anxiety over the decision that the athletes could make some money, people 
continued to watch at the same rate as before (O 'Bannon v. NCAA, 2015). Arguably, the change 
elevated the level of competition by allowing some of the world's best athletes to participate. 
Therefore, the argument seems unpersuasive that consumers would stop watching college 
athletics if athletes received competition for NIL. 
Conclusion 
Despite the fact that top-level student-athletes generate more profit for universities than 
non-athlete students, colleges place more restrictions on student-athletes than any other group of 
students. And as universities, administrators, executives and coaches all rake in more and more 
cash from the billion-dollar industry that is college athletics, student-athletes continue to be 
barred from receiving the share they deserve. While the 0 'Bannon ruling is definitely a step in a 
positive direction for student-athletes, the case was a hollow victory. Student-athletes still cannot 
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earn a fair market value for their own name, image, or likeness, and until they can, the NCAA 
will continue to come under fire. 
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